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Abstract
Inequitable distribution of doctors with high concentration in urban cities negatively affects the
public health objective of Health for All. Thus it is one of the main concerns for most health policy
makers, particularly in developing countries. This paper aims to summarize strategies to solve
inequitable distribution of human resources for health (HRH) between urban and rural areas, by
using four decades of experience in Thailand as a case study for analysis.
Introduction
Maldistribution of human resources for health is a world-
wide phenomenon and may appear in different dimen-
sions [1]. The first and greatest concern is inequitable
distribution, particularly of professionals such as doctors.
The concentration of doctors is usually highest in devel-
oped countries and cities, with better living standards,
higher income, more social recognition and greater job
satisfaction. The second form of maldistribution is in skill
mix. Many countries, such as Bangladesh, Brazil, China
and Pakistan, have more doctors than nurses. The third is
the problem of overspecialization. The fourth is institu-
tional maldistribution. Last, there is gender
maldistribution.
Multiple factors influence the inequitable distribution of
doctors, ranging from general social and economic ineq-
uity, the medical education system, payment incentives,
public/private health system development and a social
movement for reform (Fig. 1) [2]. A movement towards
increasing private sector involvement in health services,
fee-for-services payment under a user fee system, poorly
managed decentralization, and increasing income maldis-
tribution usually result in a shift of HRH in favor of the
big cities, private hospitals and specialized services.
In contrast, investment in public health, cost contain-
ment, case or capitation payment systems, improved
income distribution and effective decentralization usually
favour the distribution of HRH towards the rural popula-
tion, the urban poor, and to public primary care services,
with a resultant increased need for more lower level cadres
of HRH [1]. Thus the problem of inequitable distribution
of doctors should be considered part of overall social
inequity, as well as a problem in health system
management.
Overview of the rural public health system in 
Thailand
Thailand is a lower middle-income developing country
with a population of 62.3 million in 2002, 65% of which
resides in rural areas. The country is divided into 75 prov-
inces, 774 districts, 81 subdistricts and 6397 communes
called Tambons [3].
One main activity of early health system development in
Thailand was to establish schools to produce a health
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workforce. The first medical school was established in
1888; later, nursing colleges and schools of dentistry and
pharmacy were established. The graduates of these institu-
tions were placed mainly in the country's capital. Because
the government at that time realized the difficulties and
high cost of expanding health care services by high-level
health professionals, lower-level personnel were also pro-
duced to deliver essential maternal and child care, immu-
nization and environmental health services in the rural
villages. These were mainly midwives and junior sanitari-
ans, who received one or two years of training after junior
high school. They worked in a relatively limited number
of rural midwifery centres and health centres [4].
It was not until the early 1950s that every province had a
provincial hospital, usually quite small (20–30 beds).
During that early development period, medical students
were offered scholarships with a contract stipulating that
they would work for the Ministry of Public Health
(MoPH). After graduation, those who did not receive
scholarships stayed mainly in the medical schools, and
those who received scholarships were sent to the provin-
cial hospitals and some big rural health centres.
Factors determining the distribution of doctors Figure 1
Factors determining the distribution of doctors
Source: Adapted from Wibulpolprasert S., 1997 [2]
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The rural health development policy since 1977 had
resulted in a great expansion of rural public health serv-
ices. There were 728 district hospitals in December 2001,
covering more than 95% of the total rural districts. The
district hospitals are 10-bed to 120-bed hospitals; most of
them have 30 beds. There were 2725 district hospital doc-
tors, 57.95% of the total requirement of 4700. At the pro-
vincial level there are 92 hospitals. Twenty-five of them
are designated as regional hospitals, with 500 to 1000
beds; the rest are general hospitals, with 150 to 450 beds.
There were 5636 doctors in the urban provincial
hospitals.
Currently all professionals except graduate nurses are pro-
duced mainly by the public universities under the Minis-
try of University Affairs (MoUA), while paramedics and
graduate nurses are produced mainly by the MoPH[4,5].
The recruitment system for the university-trained profes-
sionals is quite different from that for the paramedics and
most graduate nurses. For the professionals, general
national entrance examinations are the main vehicle of
recruitment, while the paramedics and most of the gradu-
ate nurses are recruited from each province through pro-
vincial examination. In 2002 there were 11 public
medical schools and one private medical school, produc-
ing 1400 graduates (Fig. 2).
After graduation from public medical school each medical
graduate has to work for the public for three years. Public
doctors can also practise privately, and many of them do.
However, if they do not practise privately, they receive
USD250 special allowance per month.
History and trends of inequitable distribution of 
doctors
For the past four decades, the distribution of doctors to
rural Thailand has been divided into four phases:
External brain drain (1960–1975)
The high demand for doctors in the United States of
America during the early 1960s opened tempting oppor-
tunities for well-trained Thai doctors to emigrate. It was
noted in a 1965 United States Congressional report that
the first few batches of graduates from a northern medical
school chartered flights to emigrate to the United States.
Table 1 shows that in 1965 half of the new medical grad-
uates emigrated, mainly to the United States[6]. During
this period, there were fewer than 300 physicians in the
very poor rural health system.
The problem of external brain drain of physicians seem to
affect most developing countries, especially countries in
Africa. In Ghana, it was estimated that during 1985–1997
the cumulative average annual emigration rate was about
14%. This means that 50% of each batch of medical grad-
uates will emigrate within 4.5 years, mainly to the United
Kingdom and the United States [7]. Nevertheless, some
countries, such as Cuba, India and the Philippines, pro-
duce doctors for export.
This period of external brain drain in Thailand lasted
longer than a decade and resulted in the emigration to the
United States of approximately 1500 Thai doctors – 25%
of the total at that period – most of them never to return.
The result was a severe shortage of doctors in the country,
particularly in the rural areas.
Rural development with more equitable distribution
The rapid exodus of Thai medical graduates prompted the
government, in 1968, to enforce compulsory contracts
with medical students so that they had to perform three
years of public work after graduation or face high fines.
The first batch of compulsory-contracted Thai doctors
started their assignments in 1972. More importantly, the
Distribution of medical schools in Thailand Figure 2
Distribution of medical schools in Thailand
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high level of social awareness during the early 1970s and
the democratization movement, followed by the Alma-
Ata Declaration of Health for All, encouraged a social
environment to support the rapid development of rural
health infrastructures and a more equitable health sys-
tem[8,9]. These decisions resulted in an increase in the
number of rural hospitals and doctors from 200 and 300
in 1976 to 425 and 1162 in 1985, respectively, a fourfold
increase in rural doctors in 10 years (Fig. 3). The difference
between the doctor:population ratio of the poorest north-
Table 1: External brain drain, Thailand
Year Total new medical graduates Emigrants Percentage of external brain drain
1963 233 56 24
1964 236 81 34
1965 276 140 52
Total 745 277 37
Source: Wibulpolprasert S, 1999 [2]
Numbers of beds and doctors in community hospitals, 1977–2001 Figure 3
Numbers of beds and doctors in community hospitals, 1977–2001
Source: Thailand Health Profile 1999-2000 [3]
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eastern region and Bangkok, the capital, dropped from 21
times in 1979 to 8.6 times in 1986 (Fig. 4).
Economic growth and Internal brain drain
Although the rural emphasis continued, the rapid eco-
nomic growth and a government investment policy,
started in the late 1980s, to support private hospital
investment with a free flow of low-interest foreign loans,
resulted in a rapid growth of the private health sector in
the past decade (1988–1997). This situation created a sec-
ond period of brain drain, but this time it was internal
brain drain from the rural district and provincial hospitals
to the rapidly growing urban private hospitals.
In 1986, before the economic boom, the share of private
hospital beds and doctors was around 10%. This figure
increased to 25% in 1995 [3]. Since 1990, while the
number of beds in the district hospitals kept increasing,
the number of doctors did not increase or sometimes even
decreased (Fig. 3). On the other hand, the number of pri-
vate hospital beds increased, along with the number of
doctors. The private hospital doctors increased from 1000
in 1985 to 3300 in 1995, a 3.3-fold increase in 10 years
(Fig. 5) [10].
The net loss of doctors (resign-reapply) from the MoPH as
compared to new entrants rose from 8% in 1994 to 30%
in 1997 (Table 2). This situation of internal brain drain
was so severe that in April 1997, three months before the
economic crisis, 21 district hospitals were without a single
full-time doctor [11]. The beds-to-doctor ratio at the dis-
trict hospitals increased from 7.1:1 in 1989 to 15.3:1 in
1998 (Fig. 3) [3]. This increase in workload is also an
important factor that pushed the doctors away from the
rural district hospitals. The differences of doctor-to-popu-
lation ratios between the poorest north-eastern region
Differences between the Northeast and Bangkok population-to-doctor ratios, 1979–2000 Figure 4
Differences between the Northeast and Bangkok population-to-doctor ratios, 1979–2000
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Private doctors and beds in Thailand, 1977–2001 Figure 5
Private doctors and beds in Thailand, 1977–2001
Table 2: Loss of doctors from the MoPH, 1994–2002
Year Number of doctors Percent loss
Newly graduated Reapplied Resigned Net loss
1994 526 - 42 42 8.0
1995 576 - 71 71 12.3
1996 568 - 98 98 17.3
1997 579 30 205 175 30.2
1998 618 93 117 24 3.8
1999 830 168 63 -105 -12.6
2000 893 92 133 41 4.6
2001 883 67 135 68 7.7
2002 913 22 316 294 32.2
Source: Personnel Division, Office of the Permanent Secretary, MoPH
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and Bangkok rose from 8.6 times in 1986 to 13.8 times in
1996.
Economic crisis and reverse brain drain
The severe economic crisis that began in mid-1997
resulted in a rapid decline in demand for private hospital
services. Demand for outpatient services in private hospi-
tals declined from 20% to 70% [11]. Most private hospi-
tals reduced their numbers of beds and doctors; some of
them closed entirely. Rapid reverse brain drain is apparent
as the number of district hospital doctors increased from
1653 in 1997 to 2725 in 2001 and the bed-to-doctor ratio
dropped from 15.3 in 1998 to 10.6 in 2000 (Fig. 3). The
difference between the doctor-to-population ratios of the
poorest north-eastern region and Bangkok also dropped,
from 13.8 times in 1996 to 10.5 times in 2001 (Fig. 4).
The proportion of net loss of doctors also declined greatly,
and in 1999 there was a 12% net gain in addition to new
entrants (Table 2). Economic recovery since 2000 and the
influx of foreign patients as well as demand for continu-
ing education seems to have started a new round of inter-
nal brain drain in 2002 (Table 2).
Strategies used in solving inequitable 
distribution of doctors in Thailand
Thailand applied several strategies in response to inequi-
table distribution of doctors. Further strategies were
added as reactions to problems at each phase of develop-
ment. Some of them are continuous and other were ad
hoc.
Development of rural health infrastructure
To distribute health personnel to the rural areas, the
health infrastructure of the rural areas needs to be devel-
oped. In 1979 the Thai government initiated rural health
development as part of an integrated national rural devel-
opment project[8]. In order for this policy to be effective
in a period of limited resources, the expansion of urban
hospitals was completely halted between 1982 and 1986.
The effect was a shift of resources from cities to rural dis-
tricts, and a rapid increase in the number and capacity of
rural district hospitals (Fig. 3) [9]. Good logistic support,
housing and other incentives help maintain the necessary
workforce. This strategy improved quality and accessibil-
ity of services among rural facilities and resulted in a
reverse proportion of outpatient visits to the three levels
of rural public health facilities, from an inverted triangle
to an upright one (Fig. 6).
Educational strategies
Rural recruitment, training and hometown placement
Rural recruitment, training in rural health facilities, home-
town placement after graduation and limited possibilities
for private practice are factors that contribute to the suc-
cessful distribution of graduate nurses, midwives, junior
sanitarians and other paramedics in the Ministry of Public
Health[4]. They are now the backbone workforce for the
rural health centres and district hospitals. After being
recruited through the provincial mechanism, which
requires provincial residency, they have to sign contracts
with the provincial health office. The contracts require
two to four years of public-sector employment in the same
province after graduation.
These students are educated in 34 nursing colleges and six
public health colleges of the Ministry of Public Health
throughout the country. They receive highly subsidized
education, including tuition fees at 5% of actual educa-
tional cost and free clothing, dormitory, food and learn-
ing materials during their school years. Practical training
is carried out mainly in the rural provincial and district
hospitals and rural health centres where the students will
work after graduation. Thus they are quite familiar with
the rural facilities and environment. Most of them, except
for nurses and midwives, do not acquire a license to ena-
ble them to practise privately.
Attempts to use these strategies for medical education in
Thailand yielded some degree of success. The first attempt
started in 1974 in one of the central medical schools. Stu-
dents were recruited from rural provinces by mechanisms
that included the participation of provincial health
administrators and medical school lecturers. After gradu-
ation they were sent back to the provinces/districts from
which they came. This system was expanded to other med-
ical schools during the 1980s. Evidence from the experi-
ence of one medical school suggested that it lengthened
the rural service of the graduates. Two-thirds of the gradu-
ates continued their rural placement after the three com-
pulsory contracted years (Table 3) [11].
A study in the north-eastern medical school found that to
be more effective, the recruited students need to be
restricted to those who were raised in the rural areas. It
was found advisable to exclude persons who relocated to
rural areas two or three years before enrolment in the
hope of being recruited [12]. Due to problems of manage-
ment of the placement system, the system was terminated
in most central medical schools. Only three regional med-
ical schools and one central medical school still allow part
of their students to enter under this system. Thus the pro-
portion of rural medical students, which used to be up to
47% of all medical students in 1983, went down to 23%
in 1994 (Fig. 7).Human Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/12
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In 1994 the Ministry of Public Health, in response to the
internal brain drain, proposed a 10-year project (Collabo-
rative Project to Increase Production of Rural Doctors,
CPIRD) to produce 300 doctors annually, specifically for
the rural areas. The students are recruited by transparent
and participatory mechanisms at the provincial level.
They spend the first three preclinical years at medical
schools (both central and regional) and the second three
clinical years at 12 regional hospitals with the networking
of district hospitals. This project began by accepting 30
Number and proportion of OPD visits at public health facilities Figure 6
Number and proportion of OPD visits at public health facilities
( ) : Number of OPD visits (millions)
Source: Rural Health Division, MoPH.
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students in 1995 and increased to 293 students in
2002[13]. The project also boosted the proportion of rural
medical students from 23% in 1994 to 31.5% in 2001
(Fig. 7).
In April 1997, at the peak of the economic boom, 113
compulsory-contracted doctors paid fines and resigned
from the Ministry of Public Health after one year of
compulsory work. Detailed investigation revealed that
those with rural backgrounds and who had graduated
from regional medical schools had significantly lower
Table 3: Place of practice of MESRAP graduates
Batch Percentage in rural districts
First 3 years After 3 years
1–9 83.13 68.67
10 68.57 68.57
11–13 85.34 -
Source: Faculty of Medicine, Chulalongkorn University
Proportion of rural medical students Figure 7
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rates of resignation – less than half of those who origi-
nated and graduated from the capital. The three main rea-
sons for the resignations were: to go into private practice,
inappropriate relocation and continuing education [14].
It should be noted that rural recruitment and training also
proved to be quite effective in achieving rural distribution
of doctors in several countries, notably Australia and the
United States [15-17].
Establishment of regional medical schools is also a good
measure for the equitable distribution of health care serv-
ices and doctors. Conversely, central medical schools
drew doctors into the capital. The resolution of the Fifth
National Medical Education Seminar in 1986 stated that
"... there should be no new medical schools in the capital
and vicinity provinces" [18]. However, since 1986 four
new medical schools were established centrally, including
one private medical school.
Reform of medical education/specialty training/board qualifications
Reform of medical education
The resolution of the Fourth National Medical Education
Conference, in 1979, stated that all medical schools
would reform their curriculum to produce medical gradu-
ates suitable for working in district hospitals. Four main
characteristics of these basic doctors are: good clinical
competence, support for primary health care, ability to
train paramedical personnel and health volunteers, and
good management skills[19]. This resolution resulted in a
major reform of medical education, and all medical
schools sent their students to be trained at district or pro-
vincial hospitals for at least three to six months. Commu-
nity medicine became one of the major departments in all
medical schools. Rural recruitment and training and the
hometown placement system also increased.
Specialty training
To reduce the demand for specialty training abroad, the
Thai Medical Council started its specialty training pro-
gramme in 1971. There are now 42 specialty boards
approved by the Thai Medical Council. In 2001 the overall
quota for specialty training was 1161. The real acceptance
was 889 trainees, as compared to 1200 new graduates.
Quotas for specialist training programmes have been fro-
zen since 1997. Experience in rural public services is now
a prerequisite for the residency training programmes. At
least one year of rural services is required for most train-
ing, except for some specific specialties such as general
practice, pathology, forensic medicine and psychiatry [5].
Rural doctors also fall under a special quota for specialty
training, on condition that they return to the district hos-
pitals afterward. However, this control of specialist train-
ing received strong resistance from the medical schools.
Board qualification through self-experiential training
Doctors who have more than five years of work experience
in a rural district hospital are eligible to apply for a quali-
fying board examination. If they pass the examination,
they receive a Certificate of Proficiency (called the Thai
Board certificate) from the Medical Council of Thailand.
This is offered in the specialty of preventive medicine,
general practice and family medicine. The Civil Service
Commission considers these Thai Board certificates equiv-
alent to a Doctor of Public Health or Doctor of Philoso-
phy degree.
Professional-replacement strategies
Training in basic medical care capacities for rural health
personnel in the health centres was a very important
strategy that improved those workers' acceptance by the
people and reduced the number of outpatient visits at the
hospitals. Nevertheless, although these rural health per-
sonnel help screen many patients, there is still a high per-
centage (35% to 70%) of patients who bypass the health
centres in favour of the district and provincial hospitals
[20,21].
Training of nurse practitioners to serve in district hospitals
where there were inadequate numbers of doctors was
started in 1973. It lasted for 13 years and was terminated
in 1986 after producing 688 nurse practitioners, due to a
reduction in qualified applicants. At present, only 10% of
the graduates still work as nurse practitioners. During the
period of rapid increase of rural doctors (1980–1987), the
nurse practitioners' role was reduced greatly. Their career
opportunities are limited compared to nurses in other
services, and they are not allowed to engage in private
medical practice. These are the main reasons for the low
number of applicants and the rapid loss to attrition [22].
However, some district hospitals still successfully use
nurse practitioners or self-trained graduate nurses to pro-
vide outpatient services alongside the doctors.
Increased supply
Many people believe that an increased supply of doctors
will eventually lead to better distribution to rural areas.
This strategy is very expensive. The operating cost for pro-
ducing a physician in Thailand was about USD45 000 in
2002. The total cost might go up to USD100000. Evidence
from other countries, such as Mexico, showed that an
increased supply of doctors alone would not improve dis-
tribution, but would instead create an oversupply of doc-
tors [23,24].
In Thailand, increased production of personnel was usu-
ally carried out in response to expansion of the public
health services and external brain drain. Not until the
internal brain drain in the 1990s did increased production
begin in response to increased internal demand, in bothHuman Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/12
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the public and private sectors. A private, for-profit medical
school was established in 1989, with strong opposition
from the rural doctor society. Two of their members in the
Medical Council Committee resigned and held a press
conference to protest against it. Finally the Medical Coun-
cil ruled that only private medical schools under not-for-
profit organizations would be allowed. Since then, no
additional private medical schools have been started.
Graduates from private medical schools must pass
licensing examinations, as compared to the automatic
licensing of graduates from public schools.
Figure 8 shows the annual output of physicians. It is evi-
dent that the increase in output is a response to external
brain drain from demand in rich countries, rural health
system development and internal brain drain from
increased demand in the private sector. This level of pro-
duction may result in a decrease of the population-to-doc-
tor ratio from 3500:1 in 1995 to 1500:1 in 2025, a good
balance between requirement and supply [25,26].
Since 1994, due to internal brain drain, many public hos-
pitals have started to hire retired doctors, both GPs and
specialists, for part-time services. Rules and regulations for
licensing were also modified to facilitate the return of
highly skilled expatriate Thai specialists. In 1997, the
MoPH also allowed its hospitals to hire as temporary
employees foreign graduates who have not passed the
licensing examination.
Some richer countries solve these problems by importing
foreign graduates to their rural areas. For example, South
Africa successfully imported Cuban doctors to its rural
health centres[27]. This measure must be used with care,
Annual output of physicians Figure 8
Annual output of physicians
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as it may cause shortages of doctors in other countries.
Some countries, such as India and the Philippines, pro-
duce medical graduates for export in order to generate an
influx of foreign currency. In 2001 Britain's National
Health Service announced a demand of 30 000 graduate
nurses. Not many Thai nurses are qualified to work in the
United Kingdom, due to the language barrier. It has been
reported that foreign nurses represented 30% of the new
registrations in the United Kingdom in 1999 [28].
Financial strategies
Financial strategies were used in five forms:
Voluntary scholarships
Voluntary scholarships used to be given to medical, den-
tal, pharmacy and nursing students. Those who received
the scholarships were obliged to work for two to four
years in public service. This system was used in the early
days of rural health system development. It did provide
some doctors for the early development of MoPH's health
service system. This system no longer exists, but some pri-
vate hospitals give scholarships to graduate nursing stu-
dents in the faculty of nursing in some universities in
exchange for a few years of their work, in order to ensure
an adequate number of nursing staff.
Compulsory public service
This started for physicians in 1967 in response to external
brain drain, and the first batch graduated in 1972. In the
first four years (1967–1970) it was voluntary: the medical
students chose either to work for three years in public
facilities or pay a high annual tuition fee (USD400 per
year for four years, or USD3000 at 1997 prices). If they
breached the contract, they would have to pay a fine of
USD4800. This fine was increased to USD8000 and
USD16 000 in 1971 and 1973, respectively. Due to high
social concern, high tuition fees and little opportunity for
private practice, most medical students signed the con-
tract. In 1972 this contract became compulsory for all
medical students.
This strategy, combined with rural health service develop-
ment, high social concern and economic recession with
low growth in the private sector, was the main factor con-
tributing to the rapid increase in the number of rural doc-
tors, and the reduced gap of doctor density during the
decade between 1980 and 1990 (Figs. 3 and 4). If the fine
(USD10 000 in 1998 value – reduced due to devaluation)
were adjusted to compensate for inflation, it would now
be USD50000 The attempt to increase the fine to correct
for inflation was strongly opposed by the medical schools.
Financial incentives
To provide incentives for doctors who deliver rural serv-
ices, the government started special hardship allowances
for district hospital physicians in 1975. For regular dis-
tricts the rate was USD60 per month for the first year, and
USD68 per month from the second year of service
onward. For more remote areas, the amounts were USD80
and USD88, respectively. These allowances were approxi-
mately equal to the monthly salary of the newly graduated
doctors. These allowances were increased in 1983 to
USD80 and USD88 for regular districts, and USD100 and
USD108 for remote districts. It was not until the rapid
economic growth with severe internal brain drain that the
government initiated increased financial incentives for
public doctors.
In 1995, a non-private practice allowance of USD400 per
month was given to any doctor (in the MoPH) who agreed
not to engage in private practice. To increase productivity,
the MoPH in 1995 also started non-official-hours services
for elective patients (before that, these services were avail-
able only for emergency patients) with special workload-
related payments [29].
Finally, in October 1997, the government increased the
special rural hardship allowances from two levels to three
levels. Doctors in regular districts receive USD55 and
USD62 per month (reduced because of devaluation).
Those in more remote districts receive USD250 per
month, and those in the most remote districts (69 dis-
tricts) receive USD500 per month (almost three times
their basic salary).
In total, a new medical graduate working in a rural district
may receive from USD825 (in regular districts) to
USD1379 per month (in the remotest districts.) But this is
still lower than the salary of a new graduate in private
practice in an urban area, who has an income of at least
USD1500 per month (Table 4) [12].
It should be noted that in Table 4 only one item of the
financial incentives was given to compensate for hardship
rural practice (item 7) and it was hardly related to the
length of time of rural work. It has been postulated that
these incentives may only make it easier for new graduates
to pay the fine for breaking the three-year contract and
then move to the big cities.
The three levels of special allowances to rural district doc-
tors also created many inequities. Some district hospitals
only 10 km to 20 km apart on paved roads experience a 5-
fold to 10-fold allowance differential. In December 2001,
under a new decentralized financial management system
of the Universal Health Insurance Policy, these financial
incentives became more flexible and decentralized.Human Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/12
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Increased tuition fees and payback by rural public work
There have been proposals to increase the tuition fee to
medical students from USD400 to USD7500 per year, to
reflect real costs. Those who cannot afford to pay can
receive a soft educational loan from the government and
either pay back by cash after graduation or pay back by
rural work for three years[11]. The United States experi-
ence in this system yielded varying degrees of success. It
was found that about 30% pay back the loans by
completing three years of rural work, 20% pay back totally
by cash and 50% pay back both by cash and by working
for a shorter period in the rural areas[30]. This proposal
may soon be implemented in Thailand when the univer-
sities and public hospitals become autonomous in the
near future.
Reform of the health care financing system
Under the new Universal Coverage Health Insurance
scheme, started in 2001, a new financial management sys-
tem based on capitation is used[31]. Each Thai citizen
who is not covered by a health insurance scheme must
register with a hospital. The hospital will be paid a flat rate
of USD30 per capita per year. Out of this must come the
salaries of all their staff. It is believed that this new finan-
cial scheme will create a strong incentive for more equita-
ble redistribution of human resources. After
implementation, some big hospitals in the city that for-
merly were overstaffed refused to take more contracted
new graduates. Those in the more populated poor regions,
which used to be understaffed, now say they have enough
money to hire many more staff.
Social strategies
A crusading spirit, social recognition and job satisfaction
are also very important factors in attracting doctors to
rural areas.
The contracted doctors who started to work in rural hos-
pitals in the early 1970s faced many administrative and
logistic problems. They were not trained to be managers
but had to become hospital directors from their first day
after graduation. Many of them unintentionally broke
financial and administrative rules of the government.
Some of them were cheated by their accountants. Some
suffered from failures in personnel management.
In 1978, with pressures mounting, they finally created a
society of their own called The Rural Doctor Society. The
society started several management training programmes,
developed management handbooks and designed inno-
vative activities to support rural district hospital doctors,
such as rural doctor journals/newsletters, public recogni-
tion for extraordinary performance, visits to rural hospi-
tals by senior doctors for morale support and provincial
rural doctor coaches. In 1982 they also established a Rural
Doctor Foundation. Their activities boosted their crusad-
ing spirit and their pride in belonging to the rural doctor
group.
The society became widely accepted in the health arena,
among the medical profession and by the public. Mem-
bers of the rural doctors were able to win several succes-
sive elections to the Medical Council Committee. They
influenced several changes in medical education and resi-
dency training to improve distribution of doctors.
Apart from supporting rural health services, the society
also moved actively to support public health movements,
such as a national drug policy, an essential drugs list and
tobacco control. They also played active roles in the
national movement toward democratization and political
reform as well as a watchdog role to counteract corruption
and inappropriate administrative behaviour.
Table 4: Remuneration for MoPH doctors, 2002
Remuneration Rate (USD)
(per month)
Remarks
Salary (new graduate) 203 standard salary for PC* 4 level 3
Non-private practice allowance 250 anyone without private practice
On-call payment (general) 250–300 USD20 per shift (more than 8 hours)
Payment for special procedures during non 
official hours
72–126 rate depends on number and kind of procedures; provincial hospital doctors 
usually receive much more, sometimes up to USD1,500
Special allowance for rare** specialties 100 e.g., Pathologist
Professional allowance** 90–250 for medical profession PC level 7 up
Special allowance for rural district hospital 
doctors
50–500 USD50–55 for regular districts (532 districts) USD250 for remote districts (127 
districts) USD500 for the remotest and most difficult districts (69 districts)
Source: Bureau of Health Policy and Plan, MoPH, 2002 The exchange rate is USD1 = THB40 * PC = Position Classification ** Not for new graduatesHuman Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/12
Page 14 of 17
(page number not for citation purposes)
In August 1998, they revealed evidence of a nationwide
drug purchasing scandal that resulted in the resignation of
the health minister and one deputy health minister. One
of the advisers to the minister was sentenced to six years'
imprisonment. The success of the society boosted the
morale of the rural doctors and allowed them to work
more happily in the rural district hospitals [32].
Apart from the creation of Rural Doctor Society and Rural
Doctor Foundation, several public recognition awards
were also established. An annual "hardship award" is
given to the best rural doctor in the most remote area. This
is in commemoration of one very good rural doctor who
was killed during his dedicated services in a border district
in 1985. The oldest medical school, Siriraj Hospital, has
given a special annual prize for "the best rural doctor of
the year" since 1976. The medical association and Medical
Council also award the same recognition.
Several medical schools also give special recognition to
their alumni who perform outstanding work in the rural
districts. Many rural doctors are invited to become part-
time and full-time lecturers in medical schools, mainly in
the community medicine departments. Some of them also
receive honorary degrees from universities. Some of the
rural doctors are recognized at the national level as "the
model Thai of the year".
Personnel management and logistic support strategies
Rural doctors, after the three-year compulsory service, are
free to relocate to their preferred jobs. Their promotion is
also encouraged.
District hospital doctors, as all doctors in the public serv-
ices, start their career at PC level 4 (of 11 levels). Within
seven to eight years of service most of them will be at level
7, and within 10 to 12 years at level 8, equivalent to the
director of a division in the central MoPH office.
Since October 1996, they can be promoted to the PC level
9, equivalent to the provincial chief medical officers (their
direct bosses) and the deputy director general of a central
department in the MoPH. This promotion puts them at a
higher level than even the district officer (level 8).
Logistic support with paramedics, drugs and equipment,
supplies, housing, transportation and communications
has also improved greatly. Most of the rural district hospi-
tals are now very well equipped and supported by ade-
quately trained staff.
Lessons learned and recommendations
There are many push and pull factors for doctors in the
rural areas (Fig. 9). Thailand implemented several strate-
gies to solve inequitable distribution of doctors. Despite
these strategies, inequitable distribution of doctors
persists.
Doctors usually stay for a short period in the rural district
hospitals. Around half of district hospital doctors are
those within the first three years of a compulsory contract.
This proportion has remained the same for the last two
decades (Table 5). In addition, external factors – particu-
larly economic dynamics – strongly affect the
distribution.
In the near future, economic recovery and international
trade with promotion of the import of foreign patients
may boost demand in urban private hospitals, with the
return of internal brain drain. Some evidence of this is
being observed in 2000–2002 (Table 2).
Several lessons can be drawn from the Thai experience:
• Many strategies have been developed and used to
improve inequitable distribution of doctors. They have
usually been reactive strategies in response to each crisis.
They are fragmented, uncoordinated, sometimes incon-
sistent and rarely evaluated systematically. Formerly there
was a committee, the Coordinating Committee for Medi-
cal and Health Issues, to coordinate these strategies. It was
very successful in its early days but weakened during the
rapid economic growth, and was abolished in 1995 for
political reasons.
• The strategies used have improved the distribution of
doctors to a certain extent, as evident from the increase in
the number and proportion of doctors at the district level.
But the fragmented, uncoordinated, inconsistent and
sometimes irrational application of strategies resulted in a
system that cannot attract doctors to stay in the rural areas
when there are strong economic incentives in the urban
private sector.
• The combination of rational strategies in packages with
unified, integrated, consistent implementation supported
by an efficient monitoring system with established
national mechanisms is essential for the success of equita-
ble geographical distribution of doctors.
• Finally, more equitable socioeconomic development is
the basis for overall sustainable success in social equity.
This needs strong political leadership and social support.
The following are recommendations for each strategy for
the sustainable equitable distribution of doctors.
Reform of the health care delivery system
Primary medical care should be the main focus of devel-
opment in both urban and rural areas. Growth of the sec-Human Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/12
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ondary and tertiary care hospitals in urban areas in both
the public and private sectors should be appropriately
planned. No more financial support (tax exemptions,
etc.) to open new private hospitals in the cities should be
allowed. A system of "certificate of needs" may be estab-
lished. A good and efficient referral system should be
established. This reform can be achieved through finan-
cial reform of various insurance schemes. The enactment,
in October 2002, of a comprehensive health insurance act
focused on strengthening primary care as the gatekeeper,
as well as a referral system and financial reform based on
capitation payment systems, is expected to greatly
improve the distribution of human resources [34].
Health centre personnel should be further trained and
supported to deliver good primary care to encourage
patients not to bypass local health facilities. Instead of
retraining nurse practitioners, which proved not to be very
Push and pull factors and strategies used Figure 9
Push and pull factors and strategies used
Pull factors (urban)
Demand
 in rich countries
 in urban private hospitals
Better living standards
Specialization training
Better income
Higher social recognition
Job satisfaction/career
Push factors
 Lower living standard
 Low social
recognition/ career
path
 Poor
facilities/logistics
 Lower income
 Low opportunity for
training
Rural health
facilities
Remedies
Development of rural infrastructure
 communication
 schools
 facilities/logistics
Education
 rural recruitment/training/placement
 opportunity for continuous education
 special quotes for training
 support R&D and qualification
Social
 special award; career path
 civic movement
Financial
 hardship allowance plus other
incentives
 capitation payment systems
 high tuition fees paid by rural works
 compulsory public workHuman Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/12
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successful, on-the-job training in basic medical care
provided to the existing district hospital graduate nurses
would be more effective and sustainable.
Reform of medical education
Rural recruitment and training in rural district and provin-
cial hospitals should be continuously promoted. Only
those who originate from the rural areas should be eligi-
ble to enter this system. A system of support to junior high
school students in each rural district, probably by the dis-
trict hospitals and the schools, should be developed to
prepare candidates for this system. This would allow a
higher proportion of students recruited from poorer fam-
ilies in the rural districts. These students should be trained
in the existing rural health infrastructure, including the
district hospitals, particularly during their clinical years.
If there is an increase in demand in the future, the
increased production should not be based on creating
new and centrally placed medical schools, but should
depend on a flexible collaboration project between the
MoPH and the existing medical schools. Rural district
hospitals can be very good training institutions for basic
medical doctors with little additional investment. Rural
recruitment and rural training must be the compulsory
systems for any future additional production.
The current quota for specialist training of 1161 should be
tightly controlled to prevent loss of rural doctors into
training programmes as well as to reduce
overspecialization.
Financial strategies
Financial incentives should be more flexible yet focused.
A decentralized financial management system is prefera-
ble. There could be many more rates of hardship allow-
ance, as compared to the three fixed rates determined by
the central ministry. The rates should also better reflect
how long the doctors work in the district.
The fine for early termination of compulsory public serv-
ices must be adjusted to reflect inflation. Replacement of
a compulsory public contract with cost-related tuition fees
and payback by rural work should be applied gradually
and cautiously and in conjunction with other strategies.
Personnel management
The guidelines for promotion of district doctors (in this
case to PC level 9) should be implemented extensively.
This would benefit those who work for more than 10 years
in the district. Relocation after the three-year compulsory
period should be fairly free, particularly to the other rural
district hospitals in any province.
Social strategies
Social movement towards acceptance and appreciation of
rural district hospitals and health centre personnel should
be continued and further strengthened. The Rural Doctors
Society and Foundation should receive more social sup-
port and understanding from the MoPH to allow them to
pursue positive activities to improve motivation of young
graduates.
Institutional support for HR policy/management
A national mechanism to coordinate health systems and
human resources development at the high policy-making
level is essential for the consistency and sustainability of
development strategies. In Thailand, this mechanism is
proposed in the new National Health Bill, which is
expected to be enacted in 2003 [35].
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